Research presentations

At my university research profile, you find my most recent research presentations. Below, I list presentations prior to this database.

Invited presentations

Date Title Venue
11/2018Was haben philosophische Ethiker*innen einer mündigen Gesellschaft zu sagen - und was nicht?
(What philosophical ethicists have to tell to a society that has come of age - and what not)
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg
05/2018Implicit bias and the right to anonymous job applicationsBlavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
12/2016Why collective consequentialism cannot avoid the demandingness objectionColloquium in Practical Philosophy, University of Stockholm
12/2016When are collective obligations too demanding?Workshop on Responsibility in Complex Systems, Umeå University
11/2016Why Collective Consequentialism cannot Avoid the Demandingness ObjectionColloquium in Practical Philosophy, University of Munich
09/2016Collective obligations, responsibility gaps, and the demandingness objectionManchester Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester
Workshop "Collective Action: Ontology, Ethics, Application"
07/2016Doing the best we together can do by each doing our (different) bit: Going beyond Kagan’s and Singer’s simple casesColloquium for Practical Philosophy, University of Saarbrücken
03/2016Is Christian ethics too demanding?Developing a Christian Mind conference, Oxford
10/2015Justifying unpopular climate policies: The argument from moral error and moral expertiseLondon Judgment and Decision Making Group, University College London
09/2015Forced to care for the future: Justifying ethical climate policy without public supportManchester Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester
Workshop "Democracy and Future Generations"
05/2015Justifying climate change legislation without popular supportWorkshop on climate change and non-ideal theory, University of Warwick
05/2014Joint obligations and the semantics of plural imperativesCollective Obligation Workshop, Cooperation and Equality Group, University of Manchester
04/2014The human right to subsistence, and what we together can doTetova State University, Tetova, Macedonia
04/2014Why liberalism needs liberalsUniversity of SS Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia
11/2013Solving coordination problems in the spirit of individual rational choiceChoice Group, London School of Economics

Refereed presentations

Date Title Venue
08/2020Finding fault where fault is to be found: Joint ability and the problem of collective harmSocial Ontology 2020, Neuchatel (online)
06/2019with Martin Sticker: Why having children does not count towards parents' carbon footprintsSociety of Applied Philosophy Annual Conference, Cardiff
09/2018Distributed domination and the market for rental accommodationCongress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, Cologne
12/2017with Martin Sticker: The Carbon Footprint and Ethical Significance of Having ChildrenCongress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, Cologne
08/2017How refugees are excluded from the common world and diminished in their agency: A reading of Hannah Arendt and Serena ParekhCongress of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy, Munich
08/2016Collective obligations, responsibility gaps, and the demandingness objectionCollective Intentionality X, Den Haag
10/2012Inductive Proofs for Many-Hands Cases in EthicsFormal Ethics Workshop, Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy
09/2012“Yes, We Can”? - Socio-Economic Rights and What We Together Can DoManchester Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester: Workshop "Political Possibility"
08/2012“Yes, We Can” - Socio-Economic Rights and three senses of what we together can do and ought to doCollective Intentionality VIII, University of Manchester
07/2012When I cannot Make A Difference (and know it)Postgraduate Sessions of the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Stirling
06/2012When I cannot Make A Difference (and know it)Society for Applied Philosophy Annual conference, University of Oxford
10/2011What's the problem with coordination problems?Third Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy, University of Amsterdam
09/2011Collective Oughts and the Practicality RequirementGerman Philosophical Association, General Meeting, LMU Munich

Other presentations

Date Title Venue
10/2019 The Modal Nature of Non-DiscriminationCentral European University Welcome Conference, Vienna
01/2018 Implicit Bias and Obligatory Anonymous Shortlisting Centre for Ethics, Law, and Public Affairs, University of Warwick
12/2017with Martin Sticker: The Carbon Footprint and Ethical Significance of Having ChildrenIRI THESYS Colloquium, Humboldt University Berlin
Political Philosophy Colloquium, Humboldt University Berlin
11/2017Implicit Bias and Obligatory Anonymous ShortlistingPractical Philosophy Colloquium, Humboldt University Berlin
02/2017Why collective consequentialism does not succeed in avoiding the demandingness objectionCentre for Ethics, Law, and Public Affairs, University of Warwick
05/2016How, and how not, to justify unpopular climate policiesCentre for Ethics, Law, and Public Affairs, University of Warwick
10/2015Justifying unpopular climate policies: The argument from moral error and moral expertisePhilosophy department colloquium, University of Warwick
03/2015Implementing national climate policy against the will of the majority of citizensNuffield Workshop in Political Theory, Oxford University
09/2013Knowledge and collective abilityPolish-Scottish Philosophy Conference, University of Warsaw
09/2013Legalisation and freedom as harmPolish-Scottish Philosophy Conference, University of Warsaw
08/2011Two Senses of Collective 'Ought' and 'Can'Manchester Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester: Workshop "Forward-Looking Collective Moral Responsibility" (as presenter and convener)
06/2011Which collectives can be blameworthy? — Lessons from collective oughts.Applied Ethics Discussion Group, University of Oxford
05/2011What's the problem with coordination problems? Or: How consequentialists should think about starting a revolutionOckham Society, University of Oxford
11/2010What ought to be: An attempt at clarificationPrinceton Workshop in Normative Philosophy, Princeton University